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The paper aims at ‘embedding’ the outsourcing firm by considering it as a four-fold unit of analysis: 
i.e. as an organizational, production, industrial and innovation unit. Theoretical correlations 
between outsourcing decisions and outsourcing variables are formulated and then tested with 
respect to a representative cross-sectional sample of firms of a local production system in Emilia 
Romagna (that is, Reggio Emilia). The main result of the paper is that outsourcing decisions are 
indeed affected by the organizational and industrial relations typical of the context firms are 
embedded in. Furthermore, the general profile of the Reggio Emilia outsourcing firm is strategic 
rather than operative. In particular, tapping-into the provider’s resources and competences to 
eventually promote technological innovation seems more relevant than searching for lower costs by 
contracting out. 
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 1 Introduction
Empirical evidence shows that both the volume and the value of intermedi-
ate inputs and business production services contracted out by ﬁrms, that is of
outsourcing, have risen dramatically in the last two decays (Domberger, 1998;
Spencer, 2005). The determinants and the implications of the “buy-rather-
than-make” decision have thus become a core topic in industrial organization.
In particular, the attention of standard approaches has focused on transaction
costs (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002), ownership allocation and eﬃcient
investments (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986), formal vs. real authority (e.g.
Aghion and Tirole, 1997) and, in general, on the entailed incentive conﬂicts
(Foss, 2000).
Outsourcing has also attracted the attention of ‘non-standard’ approaches,
which have focused on production, rather than transactions, by addressing the
role of ﬁrms’ capabilities and competences (e.g. Mahnke, 2001). Along the same
line, the contractual analysis of the vertical scope of the ﬁrm has been settled
in ‘real time’ (e.g. Langlois, 1992; Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999) by pointing to
path-dependency and inertia.1
In spite of the inner diﬀerences of these two approaches, it has been recently
argued that understanding vertical integration and disintegration could bene-
ﬁt from overcoming the “production-transaction dichotomy” their independent
analyses imply (Langlois and Foss, 1999; Montresor, 2004). A combined research
eﬀort has thus been recommended from both of the parties (e.g. Jacobides and
Winter, 2005; Nooteboom, 2004; Williamson, 1999)).
While sharing this point of view, in this paper we claim that a further eﬀort
of combined analysis is required in order to capture the embedded nature of the
outsourcing ﬁrm. Indeed, outsourcing decisions are also aﬀected by the network
of relationships the ﬁrm hosts internally (in particular, in the form of industrial
relations) and establishes externally (in particular, with its suppliers), being
embedded in speciﬁc economic and institutional contexts.2
In order to embed the outsourcing ﬁrm it is necessary to abandon the stan-
dard view of the ﬁrm as a ‘monolithic’ unit of analysis. Indeed, the ﬁrm is
simultaneously embedded in several contexts (Granovetter, 1985), out of which
four emerge from the literature as the most relevant for the outsourcing deci-
sion, namely: (i) the organization which governs its transactions and hosts its
resources and competences; (ii) the market of the inputs (labor, in particular)
the ﬁrm uses in its production process; (iii) the market of the industry in which
the ﬁrm competes with its output; (iv) the technological system in which the
2ﬁrm faces and undertakes the innovation process.
Consistently, in the paper we propose a multi-level kind of analysis of the
outsourcing ﬁrm, by referring to it as: (i) an organizational unit of analysis;
(ii) a production unit of analysis; (iii) an industrial unit of analysis; (iv) an
innovation unit of analysis. In this way, we aim at identifying a more general
theoretical proﬁle of the outsourcing ﬁrm, which retains the manifold nature of
its embeddedness.
Evidently, this general theoretical proﬁle will turn into diﬀerent actual ones,
depending on the ﬁrms which are investigated, and on the relative importance
and speciﬁcation of the four levels of analysis (i.e. contexts). In order to il-
lustrate this point, the paper tries to determine the proﬁle of the outsourcing
ﬁrm of a speciﬁc province of Emilia Romagna (that of Reggio Emilia), where
district atmosphere and industrial relations determine an idiosyncratic kind of
embeddedness in what has been called a ‘local production system’. Indeed, we
do expect that in this case (and possibly in other similar), unlike in others (e.g.
Gonzalez-Diaz, Arruada, and Fernandez, 2000), the explanatory role of the ar-
guments which emerge by retaining the ﬁrm as an (atomistic) organizational
unit of analysis is less powerful than those emerging from the other levels of
analysis.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 will address the out-
sourcing arguments one can draw on the literature for each of the four investi-
gated levels of analysis, and translate them into ‘expected’ correlations. Section
3 will sketch the distinguishing features of the local production system of Reggio
Emilia and present the dataset of the application and the econometric model
through which the identiﬁed theoretical correlations are tested. Section 4 will
comment on the emerging proﬁle of the Reggio-Emilia outsourcing ﬁrm. Section
5 concludes.
2 From the outsourcing determinants to the out-
sourcing ﬁrm
The theoretical literature on the outsourcing ﬁrm is indeed massive. It would
be quite diﬃcult to recompile all the contributions in an exhaustive survey, and
it would not be strictly functional to this paper’s aim.
Since we are looking for the features of the outsourcing ﬁrm, and not for
“one” or “the” outsourcing theory, we will rather draw on diﬀerent bodies of
literature economic variables and mechanisms which appear relevant in link-
3ing the ﬁrm’s outsourcing decision with the four contexts the paper refers to.
In this sense, rather than making a ‘shopping-list’ review of the topic, we in-
tend to organize the literature in order to have a more general and appropriate
understanding of the outsourcing ﬁrm.
As we said, the levels of analysis in which we consider the outsourcing ﬁrm
involved are four, namely: ‘organizational’ (Section 2.1), ‘production’ (Section
2.2), ‘industrial’ (Section 2.3), and ‘innovation’ (Section 2.4). Indeed, these
seem the contexts the outsourcing ﬁrm is most sensitive to, according to the
four bodies of economic literature in which outsourcing has been investigated
at the ‘micro level’, that is, respectively, i) organizational economics; ii) labour
economics; iii) industrial organization; iv) economics of innovation.
2.1 The outsourcing ﬁrm as an ‘organizational’ unit of
analysis
To look at the outsourcing ﬁrm as an ‘organizational’ unit of analysis means
to consider the role of those “constituencies” with which organizational eco-
nomics identiﬁes it, such as, depending on the theoretical approach: transac-
tions, property-rights, contracts, resources, competences, and the like. In par-
ticular, we here focus on two of the most debated organizational approaches,
that is transaction cost economics (TCE) and the resource-competence approach
(Williamson, 1999). In trying to combine the two, the main outsourcing argu-
ments at this level of analysis can be organized as follows (Table 1, Appendix
A).3
Asset speciﬁcity and governance inseparability (Table 1: i, ii, iii, iv). Ac-
cording to standard TCE (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002) and, although
with diﬀerences, property-rights theories (e.g. Antras and Helpman, 2004), out-
sourcing is an eﬃcient governance mechanism for those transactions which do
not create potential hold-up problems among agents. In particular, transac-
tions involving speciﬁc assets, which spur rent-seeking behaviors by opportunis-
tic agents, would be better managed within the ﬁrm boundaries rather than
outside (Williamson, 1975). The reverse would hold true for non-speciﬁc assets.
By introducing ‘history’ in TCE, ‘governance inseparability’ (Argyres and
Liebeskind, 1999) turns out as important as asset speciﬁcity: in brief, new con-
tractual arrangements (such as a prospective outsourcing) are interlinked with,
and aﬀected by, the existing contractual nexus of the ﬁrm, as it has emerged
along its history. It has been argued (e.g. Mahnke, 2001) that governance insep-
arability is typically, although not exclusively, related to the presence and role of
4unions in the ﬁrm’s outsourcing decisions, as a higher union density makes the
ﬁrm’s governance less inseparable. Furthermore, governance inseparability can
be expected to be the more relevant, the older the ﬁrm, the ‘ticker’ the nexus of
contracts which constitute its model of governance. These two variables should
thus be expected to contrast outsourcing.
What is more, governance inseparability might aﬀect the role of speciﬁc
assets for outsourcing decisions. Indeed, the ﬁrm might ﬁnd impracticable ex-
ternalizing even non-speciﬁc assets - when conﬂicting with other governance
arrangements already in place - or end up with outsourcing even speciﬁc assets
- when this is instead a means for their actual implementation. The interaction
of asset speciﬁcity with governance inseparability would thus have an ambiguous
eﬀect on outsourcing.
Intangible assets and interface knowledge (Table 1: v, vi, vii). TCE explana-
tions of outsourcing also claim that tangible assets are less costly to externalize
than intangible assets (e.g. intensive of human capital), as the required infor-
mation is more veriﬁable in contracts involving ‘implementation’ rather than
‘technical’ transactions (e.g. Gonzalez-Diaz, Arruada, and Fernandez, 2000).
However, outsourcing is also aﬀected by other knowledge-related features emerg-
ing from a resource-competence approach to the ﬁrm (e.g. Montresor, 2004). In
particular, by the knowledge about the interfaces among the ﬁrm’s assets to be
outsourced and those remaining within its boundaries (Nellore and Soderquist,
2000).4 As ﬁrms’ activities and capabilities are the easier to separate from
each other the more this ‘interface knowledge’ is explicit (e.g. represented by
norms and rules), its codiﬁcation degree is an important outsourcing factor to
account for. For example, the organizational placement of the outsourced activ-
ities in the ﬁrm, typically in a correspondent division, represents an outsourcing
enabler with an expected positive eﬀect on its decision. The hierarchical de-
gree of the ﬁrm’s organization, instead, represents both a means for codifying
interfaces-knowledge through formal authority, but also a spanner for multiple
decision-control mechanisms, which might make outsourcing more conﬂictive:
its expected relationship is thus ambiguous.
Interrelationships among transactions (Table 1: viii, ix). Still according to
TCE, the externalization to the market is recommended when the dissimilarity
of the ﬁrm’s products and the geographical dispersion of its plants become so
high to make their internal monitoring excessively costly (Coase, 1937, reprint
in 1988, pp. 45-46). The degree of product diﬀerentiation and of geographical
diversiﬁcation of the ﬁrm could thus be seen as spurring outsourcing, and also
by drawing on alternative theoretical accounts: the need of developing intensive
5and extensive communication channels is just one of them (Kelley and Harrison,
1990).
Market uncertainty and asset speciﬁcity (Table 1: x, xi). Finally, according
to TCE the ﬁrm’s outsourcing decision is convenient providing the uncertainty
it faces on the market is not so high to make relational contracts inescapable
(Williamson, 1975, pp. 23-25). To be sure, still in accordance with TCE, the
costs of re-contracting in front of a higher uncertainty actually impede out-
sourcing only if the relevant transaction requires speciﬁc investments, being
otherwise unpredictable. It is thus the interaction between these two arguments
that should be expected to make outsourcing inconvenient.
2.2 The outsourcing ﬁrm as a ‘production’ unit of analysis
The ﬁrm as a ‘production’ unit of analysis refers to the way standard microe-
conomics deals with it. A ‘technical center’, which transforms factors of pro-
duction into production output by bearing various kinds of costs: labor costs
and capital costs, ﬁrst and above all. In this vein, labor microeconomics and
industrial relations have put forward some outsourcing arguments which can be
structured as follows (Table 2, Appendix A).5
Labor costs and skill content of the ﬁrm’s activities (Table 2: i, ii, iii).
Savings on labor costs are usually retained the most important determinant
of what is called ‘operative outsourcing’: the higher the relative wage paid
by one ﬁrm with respect to its competitors, the greater the opportunity of
saving by contracting out to them. However, this interpretation assumes the
presence of a sort of ‘dual labor market’, between the outsourcing client and
the provider. If a ‘developmental’ or a network/cluster approach is instead
adopted, for which outsourcing is established between ‘similar’ ﬁrms by following
a ‘strategic’ rational, rather than searching for lower wages (Deavers, 1997),
labor costs may however have no impact and thus expected to be non signiﬁcant
(Taymaz and Kilicaslan, 2005).
Of course, higher wages immediately lead us to think about the skill intensity
of the outsourcing ﬁrm’s activities, with respect to which two alternative out-
sourcing patterns can be prospected, still with an ambiguous outcome (Taymaz
and Kilicaslan, 2005). On the one hand, the client with a relatively more skilled
labor force might want to specialize more in ‘non-production’ activities (e.g.
R&D, engineering and the like) and thus outsource more standard production
activities. Conversely, it might be that ﬁrms with high skills are less willing to
outsource in order not to lose them and thus impoverishing the organizational
6competences which are built up on them. In the latter case, unlike in the former,
once interacted with the skill content, the eﬀect of the cost of labor in terms of
outsourcing should be negative. By retaining both cases, the expected sign of
this interactive variable is instead ambiguous.
Union density: labor costs and governance inseparability (Table 2: iv). An-
other popular determinant of one ﬁrm’s higher wages is the pervasiveness unions
have in it (i.e. union density), which should thus be positively correlated with
outsourcing (Abraham and Taylor, 1996). On the other hand, we should retain
that the unions’ bargaining power also increases the ﬁrm’s ‘governance insepa-
rability’, and thus its outsourcing constraining eﬀect. Similarly, the outsourcing
inducing eﬀect stimulated by the higher cost of unionized labor could contrast
that of governance inseparability we have identiﬁed at the organizational level.
On this aspect, therefore, the two levels clash and the expected sign depends
on which of the two prevails.
Firm uncertainty and demand variability (Table 2: v). The costs the ﬁrm
bears to accommodate the workload in facing an uneven demand for its products
and services (e.g. Houseman, 2001) are as important as the costs of labor, and
they also stimulate outsourcing. First of all, the ﬁrm could ﬁnd smoothing the
ﬂow of work by outsourcing less costly than rescheduling peak-demand periods
for oﬀ-peak periods internally, through ﬂexible work-arrangements (Abraham
and Taylor, 1996, p. 398). Second, in deciding the proper ‘capacity reservation
strategy’, installing a ﬁxed capacity and obtaining additional capacity by out-
sourcing might be less costly - in terms of capacity setting costs - than installing
a ﬁxed capacity and postpone the unsatisﬁed capacity demand to future periods
(de Kok, 2000).
2.3 The outsourcing ﬁrm as an ‘industrial’ unit of analysis
As an ‘industrial’ unit of analysis the ﬁrm uses outsourcing as a strategic in-
strument to compete with its rivals in the sector they operate. “Make-or-buy”
is actually represented by industrial organization as a crucial trade-oﬀ in facing
intra-industry competition (Shya and Stenbacka, 2003, p. 205), in turn depen-
dent on the nature and order of the ﬁrms’ moves and, more in general, on the
features of the relevant market structure. The most remarkable among them
are the following (Table 3, Appendix A).6
Market competition and output concentration (Table 3: i). At the outset, it
would be sensible to argue that, the higher the competition degree of the mar-
ket, that is, the less concentrated its output is among few suppliers, the more
7outsourcing is used as an instrument of competition. However, when we think
of outsourcing as a special kind of ‘governance diﬀerentiation’ (Argyres and
Liebeskind, 1999, pp. 29-30), which ‘governance inseparability’ makes costly to
implement, a higher level of competition might hamper outsourcing by making
the entailed welfare losses less bearable. In less competitive markets ﬁrms are
in fact shielded from competition by the possession of unique resources or ca-
pabilities, so that the expected correlation would have a reverse sign: summing
up, it is ambiguous.
Firm size (Table 3: ii). If we think of outsourcing as a special kind of labor
division - between the client and the provider - according to the Smithian argu-
ment, increasing returns from specialization emerge providing the outsourcing
ﬁrm’s demand (and output) is large enough. On the other hand, the outsourc-
ing ﬁrm usually intends to beneﬁt from the experience the supplier has in the
provision of the relevant production input or service, as it runs the inherent
activity at a larger scale and thus with more specialized equipment and more
competent skills. Once more, the sign of the ﬁrm size relationship with out-
sourcing depends on the relevant theoretical approach to the issue and is far
from being conclusive (e.g. Taymaz and Kilicaslan, 2005).
Industrial relations (Table 3: iii). The size of the ﬁrm also aﬀects its out-
sourcing decisions via other channels. An important one among them is the
role that, typically in larger ﬁrms, is played by industrial relations (Hyman,
2003), whose role for outsourcing decisions is to be determined case by case.
On the one hand, good industrial relations might entail a larger participation
of the workforce representatives to the outsourcing decision, and thus increase
its feasibility. Furthermore, outsourcing itself might be thought to improve the
quality of industrial relations by transferring part of their responsibility outside
the ﬁrm (Benson and Ieronimo, 1996). On the other hand, good industrial re-
lations might mean once more higher governance inseparability and thus less
outsourcing.
2.4 The outsourcing ﬁrm as an ‘innovation’ unit of anal-
ysis
The meaning we attach to the ﬁrm as an ‘innovation’ unit of analysis stems
from neo-Schumpeterian and evolutionary economics. Accordingly, it refers to
the ﬁrm’s capabilities of accumulating knowledge, learning and introducing rel-
atively new products, production processes and organizational arrangements
(e.g. Dosi, 1988). In this last respect, the ﬁrm ﬁnds in outsourcing an extremely
8sensitive variable, for the following set of reasons (Table 4, Appendix A).
Technological uncertainty and technological regimes (Table 4: i, ii). At the
outset, outsourcing might favor the ﬁrm’s capabilities to deal with the inner
uncertainty a ‘technological shock’ determines: in fact, the higher the costs of
accommodating it through some kind of ‘governance switch’, the more vertically
integrated the ﬁrm (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999). More in general, outsourc-
ing modiﬁes the ﬁrm’s ﬁtness to the relevant ‘tecnological regime’ (TR): in brief,
a speciﬁc combination of technological opportunity and appropriability condi-
tions, cumulativeness of learning and nature of the knowledge base (Malerba
and Orsenigo, 1993). In a TR characterized by ‘creative destruction’ (i.e. in a
“Schumpeter-Mark-I TR”), outsourcing might be strategic and thus expected,
as it turns out crucial in upgrading the ﬁrm’s knowledge and capabilities by
tapping into the ‘provider’, even at the risk of a certain knowledge leakage. The
same kind of leakage instead does matter and makes outsourcing non strate-
gic, and thus not expected, in a TR where a competitive advantage is rather
guaranteed by ‘knowledge accumulation’ (i.e. in a “Schumpeter-Mark-II TR”)
(Mahnke, 2001; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993).
The ﬁrm’s technological innovations (Table 4: iii). At the outset, outsourc-
ing could increase the ﬁrm innovativeness for more than one reason (Robertson
and Langlois, 1995; Teece, 1992). Indeed, the ‘conventional’ wisdom which
associates innovation to the advantages of vertical integration has been seri-
ously questioned by a ‘relational view’ (Mol, 2005, pag. 575), which considers
establishing connections with outside suppliers crucial in terms of networking
and learning-by-interacting (e.g. Dyer and Singh, 1998; Brusoni, Prencipe, and
Pavitt, 2001): in particular, in helping the ﬁrm to overcome the ‘learning-traps’
they face in balancing knowledge exploration and exploitation (Leonard-Barton,
1992). On the reverse side, however, outsourcing might make the ﬁrm exces-
sively dependent on external suppliers (Benson and Ieronimo, 1996; Dyer and
Nobeoka, 2000) and compromise its ‘absorptive capacity’ of new, external knowl-
edge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) and thus its ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece,
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Once more, an ambiguous eﬀect.
The innovation radicalness (Table 4: iv). The innovative implications of
outsourcing also depend on the kind of technological innovations the ﬁrm intro-
duces. Radical innovations, for example, have been argued to be more ‘suitable’
for vertically integrated ﬁrms as they better coordinate the interdependent de-
velopment eﬀorts required by a ‘systemic innovation’ (Teece, 1986) and/or new
‘disruptive’ products (Christensen, Verlinden, and Westerman, 2002). However,
when radicalness is due to the rearrangement of existing variables in an unknown
9framework (Henderson and Clark, 1990), a decentralization process which cre-
ates an appreciable diversity in information signals and stimulates networking
eﬀects might be more suitable than vertical integration, and not only in front of
incremental innovations (Robertson and Langlois, 1995). Accordingly, the sign
of the present correlation sign is unpredictable unless a more actual meaning of
innovation radicalness is referred to.
The ﬁrm’s organizational innovations and its ﬂexibility (Table 4: v, vi). As
outsourcing could be thought of a special kind of organizational change, one
might expect to ﬁnd it as a substitute for other kinds of organizational inno-
vations directed to re-enforce the eﬃcacy and eﬃciency of the ﬁrm production
processes. Or, alternatively, as complemented by other changes in the ﬁrm’s
organization (job rotation practices, quality circles and the like). The search for
higher ﬂexibility, for example, might be carried out by decentralizing some of
the ﬁrm’s activities, in particular when retained peripheral to the ﬁrm. Indeed,
a relationship between ﬂexibility and outsourcing has been put forward with
respect to all the diﬀerent meanings in which the former can be understood
(Benson and Ieronimo, 1996).7
3 Outsourcing in a local production system: the
case of Reggio Emilia (Emilia Romagna)
As we have argued at the outset, if we look at the outsourcing ﬁrm as an
embedded one, the theoretical correlations identiﬁed in the previous section will
take one diﬀerent speciﬁcations in diﬀerent contexts of analysis. In order to
illustrate this point, we here focus on the province of Reggio Emilia (RE) (in
Emilia-Romagna, Italy), an area which shares the typical features of what have
been called the ‘local production systems’ of the Italian North-East (Seravalli,
2001). A recent survey, carried out on a population of 257 ﬁrms with at least 50
employees in 2002, reports some interesting insights in this last respect (Pini,
2004).
First of all, although the sample of the respondents is characterized by a
high density of ﬁrms whose size is ‘medium’, these ﬁrms are actually made up
of 2 or 3 plants, of which 1 or 2 only are usually located in RE, with an average
employment of no more than 145 employees (Pini, 2004, Appendix 1, Tables
11A and 11B of CD data).
Second, a considerable number of the surveyed ﬁrms are located in ‘indus-
trial districts’ (Brusco, 1982), characterized by few but strong production spe-
10cializations, namely: non-electrical machinery and equipments - machinery for
mechanical energy and agriculture in particular - and non metallic mineral prod-
ucts - ceramic tales in particular. A large-scale kind of specialization is instead
represented by other sectors such as clothing and communication equipments
(Table 5, Appendix B).
Last, but not least, the analysis of a representative sample of the ﬁrm popu-
lation (described in the following) reveals that RE is characterized by an exten-
sive resort to outsourcing. Nearly 87% of the sample have decentralised some
of their activities from 1998 to 2001 (Antonioli and Tortia, 2004, pag. 68), and
as many as 52.3% of them to sub-contractors. On the other hand, diﬀerences in
outsourcing decisions emerge among them by considering the number and the
nature of the activities which are externalised. In this last respect, the survey
we are referring to distinguishes as many as 17 activities, which we have grouped
into 3 classes according to a functional criterion: (i) “ancillary activities”, so to
say accessory to the production process as such, meant as the transformation
of production inputs into output (e.g. janitorial services); (ii) “production sup-
porting activities”, not primarily productive but contributing to the production
process more directly than the former (e.g. engineering); (iii) “production ac-
tivities” as such (Table 6, Appendix B). On the basis of this classiﬁcation, let us
observe that cleaning services, for example, have been decentralized in 85.55%
of the cases, but the percentage falls to just more than 8% for non purely ancil-
lary activities such as human-resource-management (8.67%) and quality control
(8.09%) (Table 6, Appendix B). More in general, a distinction seems to emerge
between material, routine-based activities with a low-value added, which are
often decentralized, and intangible activities with a higher value-added, which
instead are better performed internally.
These and other speciﬁc patterns of outsourcing are of course related to the
characteristics of the RE ﬁrms. In particular, as we will see, the role that unions
and industrial relations have in them is quite important.8 Other features are
however important and can be captured when the ﬁrms are seen, as suggested
in Section 2, as organizational, production, industrial and innovation units of
analysis. A consistent empirical application is thus carried out in the following.
More precisely, the empirical application of the paper is carried out by ap-
plying the outsourcing arguments of Section 2 to a large sample of RE ﬁrms. As
it is the core of the empirical analysis, its representativeness is worthwhile com-
menting at ﬁrst (Section 3.1). The methodology (Section 3.2) and the variables
(Section 3.3) through which it has been applied will be then presented.
113.1 The dataset
The sample of analysis refers to 166 ﬁrms drawn on a universe of 257 companies
located in the Italian province of Reggio Emilia - listed in both national (Inter-
mediate Census 1996 of the National Institute of Statistics) and local (Camera
di Commercio in Reggio Emilia 2001) databases - which have been surveyed
in 2002 (for a description of the survey see Pini (2004)). As we said, the 257
ﬁrms in the population operate in 19 manufacturing sectors as classiﬁed by the
ISTAT-ATECO 91 codes and are all ﬁrms with at least 50 employees. This fact
will have to be considered in the following, as SMEs as such, of which the local
production systems of Emilia-Romagna are usually very dense, are not captured
by our analysis. Still, the sample comprehends ﬁrms with both more and less
than 100 employees, thus allowing us to provide some insights about the crucial
role of size.
Although the respondent ﬁrms were 199 (the questionnaire had a reply ratio
of 77.4%), 166 is the number of ﬁrms for which economic performance indicators
as well as variables concerning ﬁrm characteristics were also available. Economic
performances indicators cover the period 1998-2001 and are based on the dataset
of ﬁrm balance sheets registered in Reggio Emilia Chamber of Commerce and
reclassiﬁed by the balance sheet unit of the Reggio Emilia Camera del Lavoro
(trade union).
As shown in Table 7 (Appendix C), the ﬁrms in the sample are 64.59% of
the entire population. Their distribution by sector and size is characterised
by a limited bias when comparing the 166 ﬁrms with all the surveyed ﬁrms.
Both the textile sector and ‘small-size’ ﬁrms (50 to 99 employees) are slightly
under-represented. However, no signiﬁcant distortion emerges in all other sec-
tors and dimensional employees’ classes, with the number of interviewed ﬁrms
approaching or reaching 100% of the total in many of them (Table 8, Appendix
C).9
3.2 The model
In general, the use of outsourcing as a dependent variable of any kind of empir-
ical model poses, as with respect to other kinds of organizational innovations,
some methodological problems. In particular, there is not yet a shared reduced
form equation to be used in dealing with outsourcing as an ‘explanandum’, such
as instead the case when outsourcing is considered as an explanatory variable,
for example, of the diﬀerent ﬁrms’ performance (e.g. Gorg and Hanley, 2004).
A robust and feasible way to proceed is however to refer to the idea of ‘knowl-
12edge production function’ (Griliches, 1979), and deﬁne a reduced form which
attempts to provide an explanation of outsourcing by exploiting a theoretically
consistent set of covariates. In other words, we estimate a reduced form such as
the following:
yOUTi,t = β0 + β1,t · xORGi,t + β2,t · xPRODi,t + β3,t · xINDi,t + β4,t · xINNOi,t+
+β5,t · xSTRUi,t + ei
(1)
In Equation (1), yOUTi,t represents the outsourcing ‘output’ of ﬁrm i at
time t. xki,t is the set of outsourcing related variables identiﬁed with respect
to a certain level of analysis k, out of the four presented in Section 2, that is:
organizational (k = ORG), production (k = PROD), industrial (k = IND) and
innovation (k = INNO). xSTRUi,t is the set of control variables of structural
nature, β1−5 the correspondent set of coeﬃcients, β0 the constant term and ei
the error term with usual properties.
From an econometric point of view, the estimation of Equation (1) poses
two main problems. First, heteroskedasticity, as it is often found when cross
sectional data are used, may reduce the eﬃciency of econometric estimates.
Thus, all estimates will be carried out in the following by adopting a ‘robust’
estimator which addresses such a source of distortion. Secondly, there is a
potential endogeneity problem, such as when investigating the drivers of any
other innovation, as they might be conversely thought as innovation eﬀects.
Although endogeneity may be tested by proper two stages procedures, we here
stress again that the focus of the present application, as others based on purely
cross sectional data, is primarily on an extensive analysis of correlations rather
than on causal processes (Michie and Sheehan, 2005).
Given that the outsourcing arguments presented in Section 2 are quite com-
plex, the search for proxies suitable to test them empirically through a model
such as that in Equation (1) is indeed crucial. In this last respect, the pa-
per brings some elements of originality, as far as both the dependent and the
independent variables are concerned.
3.3 The variables
Dependent variable. In order to capture the diﬀerent implications outsourcing
has depending on the involved activity (just think of contracting out R&D rather
than janitorial services), in the present application we refer to an index of out-
13sourcing complexity, OUTCOMi. This index captures the number of activities
outsourced by ﬁrm i - out of the 17 considered - by weighting diﬀerently, and
increasingly, “ancillary” activities, “production-supporting” activities and “pro-
duction” activities as such (Table 6). In other words, our dependent variable is
the following (for the sake of simplicity, the temporal index will be omitted):
yOUTi = OUTCOMi =
OUTANCi · s1 + OUTSUPRODi · s2 + OUTPRODi · s3
(2)
In (2), OUTji is the share of activities of a certain kind j outsourced by
ﬁrm i. sj instead ‘weighs’ the diﬃculties of outsourcing an activity of kind j,
and takes on the entire values 1, 2 and 3 for, respectively, ancillary (s1 = 1),
production-supporting (s2 = 2) and production activities as such (s3 = 3).
The rational of these weights is both theoretical and empirical. From a theo-
retical point of view, production activities are indeed the core (i.e. the ‘primary’
activities) of the strategic idea of ‘value chain’ (Porter, 1980), while ancillary
and production supporting activities mainly ﬁt among those retained, still in
the value chain framework, ‘support activities’, whose function is to improve the
eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of the former. What is more, production activities,
intensive as they are of material assets, are those in which the core competences
of the ﬁrm are actually embodied (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990), and with re-
spect to which outsourcing thus entails a higher risk of impoverishment. These
arguments get conﬁrmed from an empirical point of view, as RE ﬁrms have (on
average, in-between 1998 and 2001) outsourced ancillary activities to a greater
extent than product-supporting ones and, in turn, than production activities as
such as (Table 6). And this is further conﬁrmed by a more qualitative analysis
of the outsourcing decisions of the sample, with the only relevant exception of
the textile sector.10
The reference to a dependent variable such as OUTCOMi, rather than to a
standard discrete one of outsourcing presence/absence, is urged by the nature of
our sample in which, as we said, nearly all of the interviewed ﬁrms resort to some
kind of outsourcing. On the other hand, although continuous, also OUTCOMi
ranges from 0 to 1 11 and this makes our dependent variable fractional. As is
well known, this fact poses some econometric problems (Pindyck and Rubinfeld,
1991). However, since the aim of the paper is detecting signiﬁcant correlations,
rather than estimating any kind of elasticity, the same problems are not very
severe and OLS corrected for heteroskedasticity can be used for estimating (1)
once plugged Equation (2) into it.
14While OUTCOMi is the main dependent variable, in order to further verify
whether correlations may change with regard to discrete choices on speciﬁc sub-
realms of the all inclusive index, we also examine by probit analysis the discrete
decision of outsourcing-or-not production (OUTPRODi) and ancillary activities
(OUTANCi).
Independent variables. The indicators used as independent variables are
grouped into the 4 conceptual blocks identiﬁed in Section 2 and formally de-
ﬁned in the correspondent tables (Appendix A). While some of them are quite
standard and thus self-explaining, some others deserve a special attention as
they have been devised on purpose to capture the complexity of the outsourcing
arguments presented in the paper.
As far as the organizational level is concerned (Table 1, Appendix A),
ASPECi tries to proxy (product) asset-speciﬁcity at the ﬁrm level objectively,
by capturing each ﬁrm i’s involvement in products whose local market (here
meant as regional) is made up by fewer rather than many competitors. Fol-
lowing Gonzalez-Diaz, Arruada, and Fernandez (2000), it is based on the idea
that in the former case the assets concerned, possibly having few alternative
users and thus generating high expropriable quasi-rents, determine the hold-up
problems which are typically induced by their speciﬁcity. In order to see how
asset-speciﬁcity interacts with governance inseparability, the former has been
combined: at ﬁrst, with the ﬁrm’s union density (ASPEGOV 1i), to check for
outsourcing binding eﬀects, then, with the unions’ role in the externalization
process (ASPEGOV 2i), to check for governance enhancing eﬀects.
A comment is also due for ORGPLAi, which tries to capture the outsourcing
implications of what we called ‘interface knowledge’ by estimating the degree
of matching between the outsourced activities and the organizational divisions
which are formally present within the ﬁrm. The greater this index, the more
explicit is presumably the interface knowledge which links the outsourced activ-
ities with those which remain within the ﬁrm, as it is mediated by an explicit
organizational relationship. Finally, we should make notice that, because of
data constraints, PRODDIFi is just a rough proxy of the heterogeneity of the
ﬁrm’s products/activities, as it checks for the ﬁrm being involved in the produc-
tion of large volumes rather than of small series only (low ‘diﬀerentiation’) or,
alternatively, in both the two kinds of production simultaneously (high ‘diﬀeren-
tiation’). Similarly, GEODIVi just captures the extent to which geographical
diversiﬁcation gets reﬂected in shares of total revenues that are distributed,
rather than polarized, across diﬀerent geographical markets, namely regional
(REG), national (NAT), European (EU) and international (INT).
15As far as the production level is concerned (Table 2, Appendix A), we have
proxied the ﬁrm relative wage (RELWAGEij) by working out the percentage
deviation from the mean of sector j revealed by the unit labor cost of each one
of its ﬁrm i. As in other cases (e.g. INTASSi), contingent ﬂuctuations have
been smoothed by referring to average values over time for the available years
(1998-2001). FIRMUNCi tries to capture the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects of sectoral
uncertainty by relating the standard deviation of ﬁrm’s i revenues (on average
in the 1998-2001 period) to the standard deviation of that branch j to which it
can be related.
The indicators used at the industrial level (Table 3, Appendix A) are quite
standard. The degree of competition of a certain sector, for example, is captured
by considering it inversely related to its concentration ratio, as it is measured
by a common Herﬁndahl index of revenues (HERFREVj).12 The ﬁrm size is
retained by using, in addition to standard dummy variables applied as controls
through the whole application (FIRMSIZE1i), the log of the total number
of employees of ﬁrm i (FIRMSIZE2i). INDRELi, instead, is an original
synthetic indicator of the intensity and quality of the relationships between
managers, employees and trade unions within the ﬁrm, in particular as far as
innovation strategies are concerned (see Antonioli, Mazzanti, Pini, and Tortia
(2004) for its construction).
A more careful illustration is required for the innovation level of analysis
(Table 4, Appendix A). To start with, TECUNCj tries to proxy the degree
of technological turbulence of ﬁrm’s i business domain by counting the number
of technological innovations which have been introduced in its reference branch
j (i.e. TECINNO)13 and by controlling for the diﬀerences in the relative
ﬁrm populations. As far as the technological regimes are concerned, follow-
ing Malerba and Orsenigo (1993), we have tried to identify them through two
variables (which expected signs in Table 4 refer to). HERFINNOj works out
the concentration degree of a certain sector j through a standard Herﬁndahl
index, but in terms of innovation rather than production. The higher (lower) it
is, the more (less) concentrated are the innovative activities of the sector, the
more it resembles a Schumpeter Mark II (Mark I) regime. SPEARINNOj,
instead, proxies the innovative turmoil of sector j over time by checking for the
average degree of reshuﬄing in the ranking of its ﬁrms in terms of innovative
activities, when diﬀerent periods of time are considered. As usual, the closer
the Spearman correlation index is to 1 (-1), the more similar (dissimilar) the
two correspondent temporal ﬁrm rankings are in terms of asset intangibility, the
more sector j resembles a Schumpeter Mark II (Mark I) regime.
16As far as the radicalness of the ﬁrms’ innovations is concerned, RADINNOi
classiﬁes as radical those innovations which are either product or process inno-
vations, retaining incremental the quality ones. Although debatable, such a
distinction could be invoked by considering that the former usually requires a
new technological base to be developed, while the latter could just require the
recombination of the existing one. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume
that a high degree of novelty of new products and processes entails more per-
vasive changes in the ﬁrm’s production and organizational processes than the
amelioration of the existing ones (Pini and Santangelo, 2005).
Finally, the other variables of the innovation level (ORGINNOi, FLEXINNOi,
INWORKi, FLEXFUNi, FLEXWAGEi and INNOREWARDi) are, like
INDREL, synthetic indicators which have been built up in another study, still
based on the same RE survey of the present one, but aimed to capture the
organizational innovations and the ﬂexibility of the sampled ﬁrms (Antonioli,
Mazzanti, Pini, and Tortia, 2004).
Once completed the description of the relevant variables, let us now turn to
the main results of the application. As a reference for their interpretation, the
correspondent correlation matrix is reported in Table 9 (Appendix D).14
4 The proﬁle of the Reggio Emilia outsourcing
ﬁrm
We ﬁrst present the results of the econometric estimates for each of the four
levels of analysis separately (Table 11, Appendix D). Then a regression including
only the variables associated with a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the
distinct four levels (Table 12, Appendix D). In such a way, the risk of high
correlations between factors belonging to the four diﬀerent sets, which could
aﬀect estimated correlations, is mitigated. Furthermore, too highly correlated
covariates deriving from the distinct blocks in the pulled regression are veriﬁed.
4.1 The organizational level
At the outset, it seems that the ﬁrms’ involvement in activities in which rent-
seeking behaviors are unfavored does not play a signiﬁcant role for outsourcing
(Table 11, Appendix D). Indeed, asset speciﬁcity (ASPEC) does not turn out
signiﬁcant at the outset. Signiﬁcant is instead UNION15, whose negative sign
supports the idea that the pervasiveness of the unions might counteract ex-
ternalization decisions by increasing the ﬁrm’s governance inseparability. On
17the contrary, governance inseparability is not fueled by the ﬁrm’s contractual
history. Indeed, the ﬁrm’s age (FIRMAGE), although not very signiﬁcant at
the present level, reveals an unexpected positive sign. Furthermore a positive
sign emerges also when the age of the ﬁrm is used as a control variable in the
regressions of the other levels of analysis: older ﬁrms seem willing to experience
the opportunities of outsourcing more than the younger ones, and their thicker
contractual history does not work as a constraint. A result which is reinforced
when the four levels are pulled together.
Quite interestingly, while ASPEGOV 1 does not turn out signiﬁcant, ASPEGOV 2
is instead signiﬁcant and with a positive sign. In other words, if unions are
enabled to enter the outsourcing decisional process actively (being informed or
consulted), the ﬁrm seems to become willing to externalize activities even if they
are intensive of speciﬁc assets. Although apparently counter-intuitive, the result
is quite interesting. While an increasing level of unionization could be thought
to increase the governance inseparability of the ﬁrm, the union’s participation to
the outsourcing decisional process actually turns governance inseparability into
governance separability conditioned on their involvement. And this would seem
to set an organizational deterrence to the hold-up behaviors which are naturally
associated to asset-speciﬁcity. In this last respect, it is interesting to notice
that by controlling, through dummy-variables, for the outsourcing implications
of ﬁrms which just inform and ﬁrms which at least consult the workers’ unions
about their outsourcing decisions, none of them turn out very signiﬁcant. While
by interacting outsourcing consultation with asset speciﬁcity makes the relative
variable signiﬁcant, thus supporting our interpretation. This result represents
an important added value of the paper and shapes a peculiar feature of the RE
industrial framework, which will be clearer at the end of this section.
As much as asset speciﬁcity, other basic insights of TCE ﬁnd a partial con-
ﬁrmation in our application. On the one hand, the intensity of intangible as-
sets (INTASS) shows an expected negative sign on the coeﬃcient, but never
reaches a suﬃcient signiﬁcance threshold in several speciﬁcations (and it has
been thus omitted from Table 11). As expected, the uncertainty related proxy
(MKTUNC) turns out poorly signiﬁcant, conﬁrming other empirical evidences
on the issue (Gonzalez-Diaz, Arruada, and Fernandez, 2000). But also its inter-
action with asset speciﬁcity (MKTASPE) is non signiﬁcant, thus conﬁrming
how TCE might not be an appropriate theoretical explanation for outsourcing
in the context of Reggio-Emilia. The only relevant conﬁrmation seems to come
from product diﬀerentiation (PRODDIF), which actually hampers vertical in-
tegration: its sign with respect to outsourcing is positive, although it is just
18moderately signiﬁcant (10%).
As far as the role of interface knowledge is concerned, its codiﬁcation into
organizational relationship actually seems an enabling factor to “detach” and ex-
ternalize parts of the ﬁrm’s value-chain: ORGPLA is actually positive, showing
a 10% signiﬁcance level with respect to OUTCOM and a higher 5% signiﬁcance
with respect to a simple, unweighted outsourcing index as a dependent variable.
On the contrary, hierachization, although possibly making interface knowledge
more explicit and thus somehow favoring outsourcing, also makes the ﬁrm’s ac-
tivities dependent on more control centres and thus hampers it. The latter eﬀect
apparently counteracts the former: indeed, the hierarchical ratio (ORGHIER)
is actually signiﬁcant (5%-10%), but with a negative coeﬃcient across diﬀer-
ent speciﬁcations, though somehow sensible to the inclusion/omission of other
covariates.16
4.2 The production level
Although saving on labor costs is usually retained an outsourcing argument,
RELWAGE does not turn out signiﬁcant, in all the diﬀerent versions of the
index we have used17 (Table 11, Appendix D). On the contrary, RWSKILL
turns out signiﬁcant and with a negative sign, a result which is ‘pulled’ by
the signiﬁcance and the negative sign of SKILL. This seems to corroborate a
strategic interpretation of outsourcing, where high skills in-house possibly spur
the ﬁrms to be more selective in resorting to outsourcing.18
Out of the two possible eﬀects the ﬁrm’s unionization degree (UNION)
might have on the outsourcing decisions, the negative one, which passes through
a possible increase in the ﬁrm’s governance inseparability, seems to overcome
the positive one, which instead passes through a possible increase in the ﬁrm’s
labor cost. The present result should however be read along with that obtained
at the organizational level, where an outsourcing enabling role of the unions,
rather than a binding one, also emerges when the nature of their intervention
in the ﬁrm’s decision is disentangled.
Finally, outsourcing seems neither a mere labor cost reduction strategy, nor
a way of smoothing the costs of adapting to ﬁrm speciﬁc demand changes:
FIRMUNC is in fact not signiﬁcant.19 Apparently, the problems induced by
market uncertainty are dealt with by resorting to other internal organizational
arrangements, possibly of ﬂexible nature, as we will argue in the following.20
194.3 The industrial level
That outsourcing would be more a competitive means in low concentrated sec-
tors than a rent appropriating instrument in highly concentrated ones can’t
be taken as more than a suggestion (Table 11, Appendix D). HERFREV in
fact does not emerge as very signiﬁcant, but its association to a negative sign
is worthwhile noting anyway.21 Quite interestingly, such an argument appears
also signiﬁcant at 1% when a probit regression concerning OUTPRO is assessed.
When we look at the size eﬀects, the only signiﬁcant and negative sign
(ranging over 1%-5% statistical levels) is SIZE1, which refers to ﬁrms whose
employees are in-between 100 and 249. The continuous size variable, when used
alternatively, is also associated to a similar, from a signiﬁcance perspective, neg-
ative coeﬃcient, driven by the small-medium ﬁrm eﬀect. In other words, it seems
possible to conclude that, compared to our “small” ﬁrms (in-between 50 and 99
employees), larger ones are possibly less involved in outsourcing activities.22 In
the context of RE, therefore, outsourcing does not appear a ‘dual’ relationship,
where the largest ﬁrms simply exploit and subordinate smaller ﬁrms to them,
but rather a ‘developmental’ or equivalent kind of relationship, where also the
latter could beneﬁt from the former in terms of ﬂexibility and specialization.
Finally, regarding the quality of industrial relations, INDREL is negatively
related to outsourcing, and its signiﬁcance depends on the variable capturing
the skill intensity of the ﬁrm (SKILL): indeed, if the latter is omitted, the
signiﬁcance level is 1%, otherwise it decreases to 10% (the relative speciﬁcation
has thus not been chosen). Accordingly, it seems to us possible to conclude
that the more industrial relations are intensive and simultaneosuly involving
qualiﬁed workers, the less outsourcing tend to characterise ﬁrm strategies, with
a moderate correlation. This is another extremely interesting result, especially
once read along with those obtained at the organizational level. Indeed, on the
basis of them it seems possible to interpret the outsourcing processes of the RE
ﬁrms as two-fold. At a ﬁrst level, the pervasiveness (captured by UNION) and
the quality of the relations which involve the unions (proxied by INDREL)
tend to determine a ‘bargaining equilibrium’ where outsourcing is less likely to
occur. At a second level, once union representatives are more directly involved
in the process, which thus occurs under their involvement, outsourcing becomes
more possible, and even counteracting other organizational risks (such as those
entailed by opportunistic behavior in front of speciﬁc assets, as captured by
ASPEGOV 2).
204.4 The innovation level
First of all, let us note that TECUNC, that proxies the degree of technological
uncertainty, is not signiﬁcant, although with some caveats on which we will re-
turn later (Table 11, Appendix D). Quite interestingly, instead, SPEARINNO
is signiﬁcant and with a negative sign. Although the non signiﬁcance of HERFINNO
somehow weakens this result, outsourcing actually seems a safer strategy to
undertake in sectors characterized by the typical turmoil (here reshuﬄing) of
Schumpeter-Mark-I technological regimes.
As far as the ﬁrm innovativeness is concerned, TECINNO turns out signif-
icant and positively correlated with OUTCOM, thus supporting the interpre-
tation, recently put forward by Mol (2005), according to which vertical disin-
tegration is not necessarily inconsistent with technological change, as standard
organizational theories instead argue (typically TCE based). The risks of di-
minishing the ﬁrm’s innovativeness by impoverishing its absorptive capacity are
apparently not conﬁrmed. On the contrary, it seems that outsourcing may be
important for RE ﬁrms to tap-into the resources and competences of the provider
and implement them into superior technological processes. An interpretation
consistent with the technological regime which can be more typically associated
to outsourcing in RE (that is of the Schumpeter Mark I type).
Quite interestingly, RADINNO turns out signiﬁcant and with a positive
sign, although the signiﬁcance level is relatively low. Although with a certain
arbitrariness, this would suggest that even relatively more radical innovations
might beneﬁt from the knowledge specialization induced by outsourcing. How-
ever, once product innovations are considered alone and process innovations are
left out, the correlation with OUTCOM becomes much more signiﬁcant, and it
appears evident that the signiﬁcance of TECINNO is actually driven by that
of INNOPROD. In other words, rather than radicalness, it is the nature of the
innovation itself which matters: more precisely, it is mainly the introduction of
a new product, so that the selected speciﬁcation has been chosen accordingly in
Table 11 (Appendix D).
As far as the organizational innovations are concerned, also ORGINNO
presents a signiﬁcant correlation with OUTCOM, but this time negative. Out-
sourcing seems therefore an organizational innovation which substitutes for oth-
ers the ﬁrm might adopt in trying to increase its ﬂexibility and, in so doing, its
dynamic capabilities and competitiveness. This might suggest that their inspir-
ing rational is actually quite diﬀerent and amounting to a change in, respectively,
the ‘external governance’ of the ﬁrm (outsourcing) and its ‘internal’ one (the
other organizational innovations). In this last respect, let us also observe that
21our proxies of functional, wage and total labor ﬂexibility, as well as the variable
capturing innovations in reward systems, do not seem to be highly correlated
with outsourcing. Only FLEXWAGE emerges with a negative sign on the co-
eﬃcient, but never overcomes a signiﬁcant threshold in statistical terms.23 Non
signiﬁcant is also the interaction between incremental technological innovations
(i.e. INNOQUAL) and ORGINNO, which was instead found signiﬁcant and
positive by another study on the same dataset (Pini and Santangelo, 2005).
4.5 The general proﬁle of the outsourcing ﬁrm
As a ﬁnal stage, we present the results of a regression including only the afore-
mentioned signiﬁcant factors (Table 12, Appendix D). As expected, this ﬁnal
regression is associated to a high overall ﬁt, regarding both adjusted R squared
and F statistics, since it incorporates the full set of relevant explanatory vari-
ables.
The extended regression does not present sharply diﬀerent outcomes with
respect to coeﬃcient signiﬁcance, conﬁrming implicitly that independent vari-
ables are exogenous and signiﬁcant correlations between them are not present.
The experience eﬀects that a longer ﬁrm history exerts on its outsourcing deci-
sion is here reinforced by a higher signiﬁcance level of FIRMAGE. The same
holds true for the governance inseparability eﬀects played by the union density
(UNION).
Among the controls, GROUP, FIRMAGE and SIZE1 emerge among the
others, while SKILL is here reducing its signiﬁcance. The variables associated
to the production, organizational, and innovation level that we have detected
above conﬁrm their impact, while the industrial conceptual level is in the end the
less relevant in terms of relative weight. We ﬁnally note that SPEARINNO
reduces its signiﬁcance to 20%, and is not signiﬁcant when ASPEGOV 2 is
included.
5 Conclusions
In trying to embed the outsourcing ﬁrm, in this paper we have carried out a
sort of multi-level kind of analysis in which, not only are TCE and the resource-
competence based explanations combined at the organizational level. But the
organizational level is in turn combined with other levels of analysis at which
important features emerge for qualifying the general proﬁle of the outsourcing
ﬁrm.
22In a speciﬁc context, such as that of a North-East Italian province (Reggio
Emilia), with the typical traits of a local production system, outsourcing is
apparently not well accounted for by TCE. Indeed, the majority of the variables
which refer to the outsourcing explanations provided by TCE are either non
signiﬁcant or with a non-expected sign. The interpretative power of TCE found
by other studies (e.g. Gonzalez-Diaz, Arruada, and Fernandez, 2000) thus might
depend on the speciﬁc sector and geographical context investigated (in that case,
the Spanish construction sector).
The institutional setting of RE might actually make TCE arguments not
very relevant: in particular, the typical industrial relations of the area, and
the ‘social capital’ which is usually associated to a district kind of local pro-
duction system might make the opportunism of the agents embodied by TCE
less explicative. This is somehow conﬁrmed by the strong interpretative power
of industrial relations, which seem to play an important role in aﬀecting the
outsourcing decisions of the RE ﬁrms. In particular, it emerges that unions, so
to say, push the brake pedal at the outset, but when outsourcing occurs, they
are involved or at least informed. Outsourcing, as other dynamics, is spurring
from a bargaining arena including as key topics labor related ﬂexibility, wages,
innovation dynamics (with outsourcing inside), employment levels, which are
typical historically and institutionally determined features of the industrial sys-
tem under analysis.
In conclusion, our multi-level kind of analysis suggests that the proﬁle of
the RE outsourcing ﬁrm seems to be more consistent with a ‘network/cluster’
approach than with a ‘dualistic’ one (Taymaz and Kilicaslan, 2005), strategic
rather than operative. Indeed, the RE outsourcing ﬁrm has the following fea-
tures: i) it is relatively not very large and does not seem just to ‘exploit’ smaller
sub-contractors; ii) it conceives a hierarchical organizational structure and the
organizational matching of outsourcing, respectively, as an obstacle and as an
enabler for it; iii) it does not appear to sub-contract to save labor costs or to
smooth unexpected demand peaks; iv) it deals with outsourcing strategically,
in particular to tap-into the resources and competences of its suppliers, which
it then possibly implements into technological, product innovations, without a
crucial knowledge leakage; v) it uses outsourcing as a substitute, rather than as a
complement, of other organizational innovations, distinguishing diﬀerent paths
of governance change (respectively, external and internal) toward ﬂexibility.
We conclude by setting out what the main directions of future research might
be. First of all, grounding on a survey carried out in 2005 on the same industrial
area of RE, we will be able to construct either/both a panel dataset consisting
23of two waves of observed ﬁrms or/and a cross section dataset with lagged terms
for the set of explanatory variables. The latter option allows an applied anal-
ysis where causality links are more easily assessed. We thus may check both
the eﬀects of outsourcing activities on ﬁrm performance (i.e. proﬁtability, pro-
ductivity) and the impact of the set of the described covariates on outsourcing
occurred in 2003-2004, by exploiting data for two independent consequential pe-
riods: 1998-2001 and 2002-2004. Another additional value added of the future
research will be the possibility to extend the dataset to ﬁrms having between
20 and 49 employees, for a higher representativeness of our results according to
the characteristics of the relevant ﬁrm population.
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28Notes
1A concise survey of these approaches can be found in Cacciatori and Jacobides (2005),
where an original link between the dynamics of vertical integration and one industry’s life-cycle
is put forward.
2In this vein, by implying networking and clusters among ﬁrms, outsourcing has recently
entered the ‘unfamiliar’ domains of regional and local development (e.g. Taymaz and Kilicas-
lan, 2005).
3To be sure, the list of reported arguments is a sub-set of those organization economics
has addressed, somehow ﬁltered by the needs of the empirical test of the paper.
4The qualitative and/or quantitative description of an input-output kind of relationship
between two establishments is the most common example of such a knowledge. In its absence,
outsourcing would be hampered by ‘opportunity’ costs of speciﬁcations (e.g. delays and
production interruptions in the transition) and of codiﬁcation, both direct (i.e. in terms of
eﬀort) and indirect (i.e. in terms of loss of richness and details) (Mahnke, 2001).
5In this kind of literature outsourcing is dealt with as the resort to ‘market mediated work
arrangements’. For a survey see Bartel, Lach, and Sicherman (2005). Once more, the set of
arguments here addressed is a sub-set of that literature.
6The present section instead does not report the outsourcing arguments of the literature
on ‘strategic outsourcing’ drawing on game-theory (e.g. Kamien, Li, and Samet, 1989; Spiegel,
1993; Baake, Oechssler, and Schenk, 1999). And neither those which have been put forward
following a network/cluster approach (Taymaz and Kilicaslan, 2005). Although quite impor-
tant, they have been omitted as their test would have required very detailed data on inter-ﬁrm
relationships that the dataset of our application does not contemplate.
7As argued by Benson and Ieronimo (1996) (p. 60), “outsourcing contributes to all three
forms of ﬂexibility [functional, wage and numerical]. Tasks undertaken are contract - not craft
related, payment is made only for work completed, and worker numbers can be adjusted to
the production requirements of the plant”.
8Out of the 199 cases in which it has been possible to detect it, for example, 20.5% of the
ﬁrms informed the unions of their outsourcing decisions, and in 6% of the cases unions were
even consulted (Antonioli and Tortia, 2004).
9In order to verify whether the ﬁrms’ sample, distributed by sectors and ﬁrm size, is
representative, a test was performed (Cochran, 1977) which yielded tolerable results (Table
8, Appendix C).
10It should be stressed that Equation (1) has also been estimated by using a non-weighted
linear combination of the three OUTji, yielding quite similar results but slightly less signiﬁ-
cant.
11In the sample, the 0s are 14 out of 166, while the other limit value, that is 1, is not assumed
by any ﬁrm. The maximum observed value is 0.88, and mean and median are, respectively,
0.28 and 0.29. Let us observe that we are prevented from transforming OUTCOMi in a fully
continuous logarithmic form (e.g. by applying the formula log
y
1−y), given the presence of
values equal to 0. Although such ﬁrms represent no more than 10% of cases, we decided
not to restrict the analysis only to ﬁrms adopting at least one of the analysed outsourcing
typologies.
12The expected sign of the correspondent table thus refers to its reciprocal.
13Innovations have been distinguished into three categories by the interviewed managers.
While product and process innovations have been indicated to them as the introduction of
relatively new products and production processes, respectively, quality ones have been deﬁned
29as ameliorations on the quality of an existing product and/or process. According to this
distinction, consistent dummies have been also built up for each of the three categories, that
is INNOPROD, INNOPROC and INNOQUAL.
14The set of explanatory variables here presented and used as covariates in the analysis is
the result of a preliminary selection of an extended full set of proxies deriving from the in-
formation sources related to the survey questionnaire (Antonioli, Mazzanti, Pini, and Tortia,
2004; Pini, 2004). This ﬁrst selection has been carried out to reduce collinearity problems and
assure the exogeneity of independent factors, mitigating biases. By referring to the full corre-
lation matrix for each level, concerning all potential covariates, and dropping high-correlated
potential regressors, the selection has produced a limited set of covariates for testing each
speciﬁc hypothesis. The ﬁnal correlation matrix (not shown) highlights low ﬁgures concerning
main independent variables, never overcoming a threshold ﬁxed around 0.20.
15It should be stressed that UNION increases substantially the regression ﬁtness at the
present level of analysis, and also makes signiﬁcant other variables at the same level: ORGPLA,
in particular.
16As far as controls are concerned, sectoral eﬀects seem of minor relevance: at the present
organizational level of analysis, only the chemical sector is associated to a 10% statistical
signiﬁcance. Among other controls, skill intensity (SKILL) and group membership of the
ﬁrm (GROUP) emerge as quite robust factors, both with negative signs, while performances,
training coverage and international market shares do not. We will devote some more words to
skills in the following. Size/economies of scale eﬀects (related to SIZE1) are also commented
in the following. Let us ﬁnally observe that the probit analysis of OUTPROD and of OUTANC
does not show any worth noting result in addition to what commented and presents lower
statistical robustness for the overall regression. This is an outcome which characterizes all the
four levels, with few exceptions we will stress in due course.
17The cost of labor emerges as a weak outsourcing determinants also in other studies carried
out at the ﬁrm level such as Abraham and Taylor (1996) and Taymaz and Kilicaslan (2005).
18The speciﬁcation including RWSKILL has been preferred to that with SKILL having
a better ﬁtness in general.
19Of course, more accurate proxies are needed to get to such a conclusion. Let us note that
the interaction between FIRMUNC and asset speciﬁcity turns out signiﬁcant and negative,
thus apparently supporting a TCE kind of interpretation. However, the latter interactive
turns out correlated with ASPEGOV 1: the correlation between the two is around 0.25; not
excessively high, but some suspects may remain that the variable signiﬁcance is driven by the
latter.
20Concerning controls at the production level of analysis, we note and conﬁrm a 1% signiﬁ-
cance of SKILL and a 10% signiﬁcance for the chemical sector dummy, both with a negative
sign.
21To be sure, the same variable turns out signiﬁcant and with an expected negative sign
if Pavitt sectors, rather than sectors as such, are used as a control variable. See Table 11
(Appendix D).
22In general, the size dummy FIRMSIZE1 has been preferred to the continuous variable
FIRMSIZE2 as more signiﬁcant, but signs are consistent. Let us observe that, though
partially unexpected, the size eﬀect we detected is also found by Abraham and Taylor (1996)
for most outsourced activities, while Mol (2005) does not ﬁnd signiﬁcant size eﬀects in a recent
study on the relationship between outsourcing and innovation.
23As far as controls are concerned, SKILL and FIRMAGE are both highly signiﬁcant for






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Istat Ateco91 N. of N. of employees Average N. of
Sectors ﬁrms per establishment employees
(2 and 3 digit) (% of total) (% of total) per establishment
Food and Beverage 5.45 6.65 170
Textiles 1.56 1.08 96
Clothing 4.67 6.74 201
Wood and wood products 0.78 0.61 109
(excl. furniture)
Pulp, paper and paper products 1.56 1.69 152
Printing and publishing 1.17 1.10 131
Chemicals 1.56 1.81 162
(excl. chemicals)
Rubber and plastic products 6.23 4.70 105
Non-metal mineral products: 21.79 20.94 134
- Ceramic tiles 15.95 15.37 134
- Other non metal minerals 5.84 5.56 133
Iron and stell and other basic metals 1.95 1.86 133
Fabricated metal products 9.73 6.82 98
(excl. machinery)
Machinery and equipments: 34.63 36.27 146
- Machinery for mechanical energy 8.56 10.74 175
- Other generic machinery 8.56 7.77 126
- Agricultural machinery 4.67 6.19 185
- Machinery for metal transformation 1.17 0.66 79
- Other speciﬁc machinery 8.95 6.08 95
- Machinery for domestic use 2.72 4.82 247
Oﬃce machinery 0.39 0.23 84
Electrical machinery 3.89 4.51 161
TV, radios and other comm. 0.78 1.63 291
equipment)
Medical, precision and 0.39 0.39 141
optical instrument)
Motor-vehicles, trailer 1.56 1.88 169
and semitrailers)
Other transport equipment 1.17 0.76 91
Furniture and other manufacturing 0.78 0.33 59
Total 257 = 100 35798 = 100 139
Table 5: Reggio Emilia: industrial structure of the ﬁrm population (2001)
37Outsourced activities Outsourcing ﬁrms
(% of the total)
Ancillary activities
1 Inventories management 14.45%
2 Internal logistics 24.86%
3 Distribution logistics 24.28%
4 Cleaning services 85.55%
5 Plants maintenance 77.46%
6 Machinery maintenance 63.01%




10 Research & Development 16.18%
11 Labor consultancy 58.96%
12 Human resource management 8.67%
13 Quality control 8.09%
Production activities
14 Supply of intermediate products 52.52%
15 Production stages 44.60%
16 Products & Trademarks 14.39%
17 Other production activities 9.35%
100 = 166 (sample of respondent ﬁrms)























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F test (prob) 3.11 (0.0001)
adj-R-squared 0.1868
N 166
Table 12: Regression results: the all levels (see illustrative notes)
Illustrative notes for Table 11 and 12
1. t ratios only are shown, since we do not emphasize elasticities. *: signiﬁcant at 10%
signiﬁcance level; **: at 5% signiﬁcance level; ***: at 1% signiﬁcance level. Non
relevant covariates (with t ratios lower than 1.645) are generally omitted.
2. All regressions adopt by default a White corrected robust estimator for the variance
covariance matrix to address heteroskedasticity.
3. Apart from the production level, two speciﬁcations are shown for each of the others
by varying the regressors included. Only ﬁnal speciﬁcations, consistent with a ‘from
general to particular’ estimation procedure, are shown.
4. Controls are not shown except for size-related dummies and ﬁrm age. Other controls
include: macro manufacturing sub-sectors (chemical, machinery, ceramic) or, alterna-
tively, production orientation a’ la Pavitt (Labour Intensive (LI), Resource Intensive
(RI), Specialized Suppliers (SS), Scale Intensive (SI)), ﬁrm training coverage, interna-
tional turnover market share, number of establishments per ﬁrm, ﬁrm performance and
group membership. All control variables are not signiﬁcant except for group member-
ship (GROUP), which in some regressions arises with a negative sign and on average
with a 5% signiﬁcance coeﬃcient. They are nevertheless included to control for cross
section heterogeneity. When highly insigniﬁcant they are omitted from ﬁnal speciﬁca-
tions and not shown.
46